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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No. 20020201-SC

v.
JOSE LUIS VICENTE,
Defendant-Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
THIS COURT REVIEWS FOR CORRECTNESS THE COURT OF
APPEALS' DECISION TO REACH THE MERITS OF THIS APPEAL
The court of appeals reached the merits of defendant's appeal despite defendant's
status as a fugitive, apparently believing that a decision to dismiss or adjudicate was
discretionary. See State v. Vicente, 2002 UT App 43 (memorandum decision). Defendant
now claims that this Court should review the court of appeals' decision to adjudicate a
fugitive defendant's appeal for an abuse of discretion. Br. Respondent at 2. This Court
should review for an abuse of discretion, however, only if the court of appeals correctly
determined that the decision to reach the merits was discretionary. That is a question of
law, reviewable for correctness on certiorari review. See State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,
1 6, 994 P.2d 1243; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 17, 933 P.3d 837. If the court of
appeals improperly determined that the decision is discretionary, this Court must reverse.

If the court of appeals properly determined that the decision is discretionary, then—and
only then—will this Court will review the discretionary decision for an abuse of
discretion
Defendant's cited cases are not to the contrary. As explained in the following
Argument, dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal is mandatory, not discretionary,
although dismissal is without prejudice and subject to reinstatement when the fugitive
returns and is again subject to the control of the judicial system. See State v. Tuttle, 713
P.2d 703, 704-705 (Utah 1985). This Court's precedent uses mandatory, not
discretionary, language in its cases on this issue. Seef e.g., Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d
473,474 (Utah 1981) (stating that fugitive "cannot call upon the resources of the Court
for determination of his claims" and "'escaped prisoner should not be allowed to reap the
benefit of a decision in his favor when the state could not enforce a decision in its
favor'") (citation omitted).
Further, defendant is not aided by the two Utah court of appeals cases he cites.
One, State v. Vicente, 2002 UT App 43 (memorandum decision), does suggest that the
decision to reach the merits of a fugitive defendant's sentence is a discretionary
decision—"we decline to dismiss this appeal." Id. at % 3. Vicente, however, is the case
here under review. In reviewing the case, this Court surely is not bound by the very
decision it is reviewing. In any case, Vicente is a decision from the court of appeals and
is not binding on this Court. See Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 n.l (Utah 1998).

2

The other case, State v. Moya, 815 P 2d 1312 (I Jtah App. 1991), is similarly
iinpcrsUiisp r I ilk I \tiente \hn ii i i ilrusmn tmifti lln11 iiiiil nl .ippf.ih Mil tliei'Hoif IH
not binding on this Court. Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 70 n. 1. In addition, in reaching its
decision in Moya, the court of appeals majority rejected "the statefs] suggestion] at oral
argument that defendant [was then] a fugitive

justice," concluding that ''nothing

in the record... substantiate)^] this claim" and observing that "the state has not sought
dismissal of the appeal on this basis." 815 P.2d at 1313 n.l. The court of appeals
therefore did not determine whether it could address a fugitive defendant's appeal, and
the

. provide*

Dport for defendant's claim that review should be for abus*

discretion.
Defendant's citations to foreign cases to support his standard of review argument
ai € • like * ise inappositi

" s i t|iiliiiic (il III lln Inline nig 'ugtnm ml in iiinsilu'linii

dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal is with prejudice, the procedural and policy
considerations favoring discretionary, rather than automatic, dismissal are different than
the> are in a jurisdiction like Utah, where dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal is
without prejudice and subject to reinstatement upon the defendant's return from
fugitivity.
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Reply to Defendant's Point I
UNDER UTAH PRECEDENT, A DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO
APPELLATE REVIEW OF HIS APPEAL WHILE HE REMAINS A
FUGITIVE BUT IS ORDINARILY ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT
OF HIS APPEAL UPON HIS RETURN
A.

This Court's precedent mandates dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal.
This Court has clearly held that a defendant is not entitled to appellate review of

his appeal while he remains a fugitive. In Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473 (Utah 1981),
this Court held that a fugitive defendant "cannot call upon this Court to decide his appeal.
Id. at 474 (emphasis added). By escaping, the fugitive defendant "has placed himself
outside the control of the judicial system." Id. Therefore, "a ruling adverse to him could
not be enforced." Id. Consequently, he "cannot call upon this Court to decide his
appeal." Id. (emphasis added). This Court also quoted and declared its agreement with
the following reasoning: 'The dismissal of such an appeal is justified on the theory that
the escaped prisoner should not be allowed to reap the benefit of a decision in its favor
when the state could not enforce a decision in its favor." Id. (citing Golden v. State, 243
SE.2d 303, 304 (Ga. App 1978) (emphasis added).
This Court revisited its decision in Hardy when it decided State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d
703 (Utah 1985). Again, this Court employed mandatory language when it reiterated the
"settled rule" laid out in Hardy: "[0]ne who escapes places himself beyond the reach of
the judicial system and any ruling cannot be enforced against him, therefore, he should

4

not be allowed to pursue an appeal while out of custody." Turtle, 713 P.2d at 704
(emphasis added).
This language indicates that appellate courts must dismiss the appeals of fugitive
defendants. It does not suggest that appellate courts should exercise their discretion in
dismissing these appeals or that appellate courts should engage in the kind of weighing
•miiif! hiilfiiu: nig of factors that attends discretionary decision-making.1
B.

In a jurisdiction like Utah, where dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal is
without prejudice and subject to reinstatement upon the defendant's return
from fugitivity, sound policy favors automatic dismissal.
I he i: I lie r eqi nil ing oi pei mittingan appellate \

defendant's appeal, sometimes called the "fugitive dismissal rule," the "fugitive
disentitlement doctrine," or the "escape rule," varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In most jurisdictions, the dismissal rule is a judicially-created doctrine See
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234,242 (1993) (noting that "our cases
consistently and unequivocally approve dismissal as an appropriate sanction when a
prisoner is a fugitive during 'the ongoing appellate process'"); State v. Schneider, 888
* «*• '•

995) f shaping contours of judicial rule while observ i n g

1

Defendant states that Hardy v. Morris "discussfes] the circumstances under which
an appellate court declines review." Br. Respondent at 2 (emphasis in original). Hardy's
only use of the term "decline" is a reference to a United States Supreme Court decision
"declining to adjudicate the merits of [a fugitive's] appeal." 636 P.2d at 474 (citing Molinaro
v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)). As explained under Reply to Defendant's Point
LB., the dismissal of an appeal in the federal system is a dismissal with prejudice and
therefore raises different procedural and policy considerations than a dismissal without
prejudice, the dismissal mandated by Hardy and its progeny.
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that no Idaho statute or promulgated rule requires dismissal of an appeal as a result of
appellant's escape from custody); State v. White, 81 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Mo. App. 2002)
(referring to "judicially created doctrine").
In other jurisdictions, however, the dismissal rule is a creation of statute or rule.
See Or. R. App. P. 8.05(3) (If a defendant... on appeal of an adverse decision, escapes or
absconds from custody or supervision, the respondent on appeal may move for dismissal
of the appeal. If the appellant has not surrendered at the time the motion is decided by the
court, the court shall allow the motion and dismiss the appeal

"); Tex. R. App. P. 42.4

("The appellate court must dismiss an appeal on the State's motion, supported by
affidavit, showing that the appellant has escaped from custody pending the appeal
and... has not, within ten days after escaping, voluntarily returned to lawful custody
within the state/').
In Oretega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993), the United States
Supreme Court enumerated some of the reasons for applying the rule to dismiss the
appeals of fugitive defendants:
•

while a defendant is fugitive, there is "no assurance that any judgment" an
appellate court might issue "would prove enforceable,"

•

fugitivity "disentitles a defendant to call upon the resources" of the
appellate court,

•

dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal "discourages escape and
encourages voluntary surrenders," and

•

dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal "advances an interest in efficient,
dignified appellate practice."

Id. at 239-242.
6

Defendant argues that the fugitive dismissal rule should be discretionary in Utah,
that is, that Utah appellate courts should exercise their discretion to determine whether or
not to reach the merits of appeals by fugitive defendants. See Br. Respondent at 2, 12-13.
In support, he correctly observes that the fugitive dismissal rule is discretionary in the
federal system and in some state courts, including Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, and
Oklahoma.2 See id.
In citing the discretionary exercise of the rule in some jurisdictions, however,
defendant does not address a critical distinction between the operation of the rule in most
other jurisdictions and the operation of the rule in Utah. In most jurisdictions, when a
fugitive's appeal is dismissed, the dismissal is not—as in Utah—without prejudice.
Rather, as imposed by most jurisdictions, the fugitive dismissal rule operates to
extinguish a defendant's right to appeal and not merely to postpone defendant's exercise
of the right. See State v. Bell, 608 N.W.2d 232, 235 (N.D. 2000); State v. Collins, 42
S.W.3d 736, 738-739 (Mo. App. 2001); In re CG., 630 A.2d 1266,1268 (Pa. Super.
1993). Thus, the dismissal of a fugitive's appeal is not—as in Utah—subject to
reinstatement when the defendant is apprehended. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 608 N.W.2d
232, 235 (N.D. 2000) ("We hold that [the defendant] is precludedfrommaintaining his
appeal because he forfeited and abandoned his appeal by escaping."); State v. Collins, 42
S.W.3d 736, 738-739 (Mo. App. 2001) ("The escape rule operates to deny the right of

2

Defendant does not note, however, that application of the rule is mandatory in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Or. R. App. P. 8.05(3); Tex. R. App. P. 42.4.
7

appeal to a defendant who escapes justice.") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); In re C.G., 630 A.2d 1266, 1268 (Pa. Super. 1993) ("Where a defendant is a
fugitive at any time after post-trial proceedings commence he forfeits his right to
appellate review. This forfeiture is irrevocable and cannot be undone despite capture or
voluntary return to custody.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But see
People v. Taylor, 617 N.E.2d 188, 190 (111. App. 1993) ("[A]n appellate court has
discretionary power to refuse to hear a fugitive's appeal unless and until the fugitive
returns

"). Therefore, precisely because invocation of the rule works a sweeping

disentitlement, most jurisdictions make the decision to dismiss discretionary with the
appellate courts.3

3

Some of the cases cited by defendant in his argument for discretionary treatment
involve defendants who absconded, but who were no longer at large at the time of their
appeals. See Br. Respondent at 12-13 (citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S.
234 (1993) and State v. Nath, 52 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2002)). Whether to hear the appeal of a
defendant who was once a fugitive is not the same question as whether to hear the appeal of
a defendant who is and remains a fugitive during the pendency of his appeal. See OrtegaRodriquez, 507 U.S. at 249 ("[W]e conclude that while dismissal of an appeal pending while
the defendant is a fugitive may serve substantial interests, the same interests do not support
a rule of dismissal for all appeals filed by former fugitives."); Nath, 52 P.3d at 862-863
(contrasting policy considerations where defendant is absent during trial court proceedings
with those considerations where defendant is absent during appellate proceedings).
In jurisdictions where dismissal is equivalent to forfeiture, courts exercise their
discretion more liberally to hear the appeals of defendants who, though formerly fugitives,
are not fugitives during the appellate process. Seet e.g., Oretega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 242246; Nath, 52 P.3d at 862-863. In Utah, however, the appellate courts have no discretionary
power to hear or refuse to hear the appeals of former fugitives. This Court's decisions do not
allow an appellate court to dismiss a former fugitive's appeal or to refuse to reinstate a
former fugitive's appeal unless the State can show that it has been prejudiced by the
defendant's absence. See State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah 1996).
8

Utah, on the other hand, has a very liberal reinstatement rule. "[U]nless the State
can show that it has been prejudiced by the defendant's absence and the consequent lapse
of time," "a criminal appeal dismissed after escape may be reinstated." Tuttle, 713 P.2d at
705. In jurisdictions where reinstatement is not available, sound policy militates in favor
of a discretionary approach to dismissal. A mandatory dismissal rule might operate to
punish defendants whose escapes have had little effect on the appellate process or who,
despite brief absences, have clearly meritorious claims. In Utah, however, where this
Court has held that "refusing to reinstate appeals of those who escape and are returned to
custody raises serious due process and equal protection questions under the Utah
Constitution," an automatic dismissal rule is an efficient means to address the appeals of
fugitives, some of whom will never return to the jurisdiction. The automatic dismissal
rule relieves the appellate courts and the State of the burden associated with processing an
appeal that would involve "an uncertain, if not entirely futile, expenditure of judicial [and
prosecution and defense] resources." 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 27.5(c)
(2d ed. 1999). At the same time, because Utah dismissals are readily subject to
reinstatement, an automatic dismissal rule does not result in the forfeiture of a defendant's
right to appeal.

9

Reply to Defendant's Point II
WHERE A DEFENDANT IS A FUGITIVE, AN APPELLATE
COURT MAY NOT REACH THE MERITS OF HIS CLAIM THAT
HIS SENTENCE WAS ILLEGALLY IMPOSED UNDER UTAH
RULE OF PROCEDURE 22(e)
Defendant argues that "an appellate court can consider whether a sentence was
illegally imposed under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) even if the issue was not
raised below and the defendant is absent." Br. Respondent at 26. Defendant has merged
two issues: first, whether an appellate court can reach the merits of a defendant's claim
that his sentence was illegally imposed under Rule 22(e) if the issue is raised for the first
time on appeal and, second, whether an appellate court can reach the merits of the claim
where defendant is a fugitive.
Under this Court's precedent, an appellate court can reach the merits of a
defendant's claim that his sentence is an illegal sentence under rule 22(e), "even if the
issue is raised for the first time on appeal." See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah
1995). By extension, it seems reasonable that an appellate court can reach the merits of a
defendant's claim that his sentence is an "illegally imposed" sentence under rule 22(e),
even if that issue is raised for the first time on appeal. (The State, however, disputes
defendant's characterization of the sentence here as "illegally imposed" for purposes of
rule 22(e). See Br. Petitioner at 7 n.3.)
However, rule 22(e) provides no exception to Utah's fugitive dismissal rule. Rule
22(e) provides only an exception to the normal preservation requirement, an exception

10

consistent with the language indicating that the sentences can be corrected "at any time."
Rule 22(e) does not address fugitive appeals and does not provide an avenue to appellate
review where review is barred for reasons other than lack of preservation. It does not
"trump" Utah's fugitive dismissal rule.
Defendant further argues that the court of appeals correctly reasoned that
considerations of judicial economy also support a holding that an appellate court can
review an illegal sentence even when the claim is raised by a fugitive defendant. Br.
Respondent at 27-28. Even assuming that resolution of the appeal might in some way
further the interests of judicial economy, consideration ofjudicial economy is a merely
discretionary matter. The interests ofjudicial economy do not displace or "trump" the
established precedent of this Court regarding the dismissal of fugitive appeals.4
The Court of Appeals' decision to review defendant's rule 22(e) claim, despite his
fugitive status, was error.5

4

Further, dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal at the earliest possible
juncture is the most economic use of judicial resources. As soon as a defendant's fugitive
status is known, the appellate court, on its own sua sponte motion or upon request of either
party, should dismiss. It makes little sense for either party to brief the issues or for the court
to devote its resources to an appeal that will have no practical effect unless and until the
defendant returns to the jurisdiction.
5

Even had the decision to dismiss or adjudicate been discretionary, the court of
appeals' decision to reach the merits would have constituted an abuse of discretion. The
Court of Appeals apparently believed that Statev. Wanosiky2Q0\ UTApp241,31 P.3d615,
controlled the fugitive dismissal issue. It did not. Wanosik was not a fugitive at the time his
appeal was decided, and the Wanosik court did not address the rights of fugitive defendants.
Because the court of appeals erroneously concluded that it was bound by Wanosik, it
abused its discretion. See Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, f 41, 34 P.3d 194
11

RESPECTFULLY submitted on _ ^ _ January 2003.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

-"2T
( JEANNE B. INOUYE
\Assk*ant Attorney General

(holding that "court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard"). Further,
this Court had already granted certiorari review in Wanosik when the court of appeals filed
its decision in the instant case. Where defendant was fugitive and not incarcerated, the court
of appeals might wisely have postponed its decision until this Court had determined whether
the court of appeals' Wanosik decision was correct.
Further, the court of appeals9 other cited basis for its decision—judicial
economy—was unreasonable. Resolution of a fugitive defendant's rule 22(e) claim would
not, in fact, economize the use ofjudicial resources. Resolution of a rule 22(e) claim while
a defendant is a fugitive does not save any resources. If a defendant returns, his appeal may
be reinstated. The appeal would come before the appellate court in the same posture it had
when it was dismissed. No remand to the trial court would be necessary. The rule 22(e)
claim would remain with the appellate court and the court would expend approximately the
same quantity of judicial resources to resolve the issue after the fugitive defendant returns
as it would have expended to resolve the issue while the defendant remained a fugitive.
Resolution of a rule 22(e) claim while a defendant is a fugitive may, however, waste
judicial resources. A fugitive defendant may, in fact, never return to the jurisdiction. Where
a defendant does not return, his appeal would not be reinstated. If the appellate courts
postpone the adjudication of claims raised by fugitive defendants, waiting until the
defendants are again in the jurisdiction, they will expend judicial resources only where the
expenditure will have some practical effect. They will not waste resources adjudicating the
claims of defendants who will never return and for whom an adjudication may well be
unenforceable. Considerations ofjudicial economy therefore support dismissing the claims
of fugitive defendants, including their rule 22(e) claims. Because judicial economy favors
postponement of a decision on a fugitive defendant's appeal, a decision to hear a fugitive
defendant's appeal for reasons of judicial economy would be unreasonable and an abuse of
discretion. See West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 373 n.l (Utah App. 1997)
(holding that court abuses its discretion when its acts unreasonably).
12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Petitioner were
this

8 January 2003 either mailed,first-classpostage prepaid, or hand-delivered to an

agent for the following:
JOAN C. WATT
ANDREA J. GARLAND
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Defendant/Respondent

15

13

